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1. Introduction
The problem of the cooperative (or indeed non-cooperative) management of shared re-
newable resources, such as transboundary sh stocks, has received a considerable amount
of attention in the literature, primarily from a game theoretic perspective (see, for exam-
ple, Kaitala and Lindroos 2007, Lindroos 2008, Munro 2009, Hannesson 2011, Long 2011,
2012, Lindroos and Munro 2013). In general, analysis has focused on the determination
of optimal harvest shares and the possibilities for cooperative agreement on harvests by
participating countries. In common with most theoretical models of shery exploitation,
either harvest itself, or harvest as a function of shing e¤ort, is taken as the control
variable. In practice, however, national administrations are only able to control harvest
indirectly, by introducing management measures (such as quotas) and then expending
enforcement e¤ort in order to achieve a degree of compliance by their shing industries.
Given that enforcement is costly, and there is, therefore, a social cost to controlling har-
vest, the need for enforcement inevitably implies second-best solutions in which optimal
harvests di¤er from those which would hold were enforcement perfect and costless.1
It is also apparent that, in the case of many shared sh stocks, for better or worse
international agreements do exist on harvest shares, at least in principle. Once such
agreements are reached, moreover, they tend to endure, since they are politically costly
to renegotiate. A good example is provided by the Atlantic and North Sea sheries of
the European Union (EU).2 Here, xed shares of TACs (total allowable catches) were
1 This mirrors, but is not identical with, the more general observation that perfect regulatory enforcement is unlikely
to be optimal if enforcement is costly (Sutinen and Andersen 1985). The distinction stems from the fact that here
we are not trying to achieve compliance per se but rather an e¢ cient level of harvest.
2 A notable exception is the Northeast Atlantic mackerel shery, which is shared between the EU, Norway, the
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agreed in 1983 after years of di¢ cult negotiations (see Holden and Garrod 1994). Since
then, the shares have remained more or less constant (according to the so-called principle
of relative stability) as no EU Member State has wanted to reopen negotiations. The
fundamental problems for resource management in such cases are, rstly, the setting of an
annual TAC or TACs to be divided amongst participating countries as national quotas,
and secondly, compliance with those quotas by national shing eets, which depends upon
countriesindividual enforcement e¤orts. These real-world problems form the motivation
for the investigations in this paper.
The paper builds upon earlier work by Beard and Nøstbakken (2010) which analysed a
dynamic noncooperative game in enforcement between two countries. Here, we consider
both enforcement and the setting of the TAC in a model of a single shared (transbound-
ary) sh stock exploited by two countries which have previously reached agreement on
their percentage shares of the TAC.3 Once the TAC is determined, therefore, each coun-
trys quota is xed and the problem for the country is then to choose a level of costly
enforcement e¤ort to apply to its shing eet in order to maximise national economic ben-
ets while securing what it considers to be an acceptable degree of compliance with the
quota (which we always assume to be constraining on harvest). Given the national quota
and the level of enforcement, the eets then respond rationally with a privately optimal
harvest level. We assume that the country knows this harvest response function when
it chooses a level of enforcement e¤ort and hence national harvest and enforcement are
jointly determined. We therefore treat national enforcement choice as essentially myopic,
Faroe Islands and Iceland. In this case, all parties agree on the ICES-recommended TAC, but due in part to
changing migration patterns there was profound disagreement over quota shares.
3 We leave to one side the question of how such an agreement was reached.
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with countries concerns for the long term conservation of the stock focused primarily
on the determination of the TAC. Nevertheless, we compare the countriesenforcement
choices with the socially e¢ cient levels of enforcement, given the quotas in force (this is
equivalent to the cooperative outcome for a dynamic game in quota enforcement).
We then go on to consider the setting of an e¢ cient TAC for the shery, given the
agreed national TAC shares and the enforcement and harvest choices of the participat-
ing countriesadministrations and their shing eets. At rst sight, the problem seems
straightforward enough. We nd, however, that there are two sources of ine¢ ciency in
the optimal management of a shared resource in this way. The rst stems from the likely
sub-optimal allocation of the TAC between countries. In principle at least, this could
simply be solved by adjustments in the quota shares. The second source of ine¢ ciency
lies in the (assumed) desire of countries to achieve a degree of compliance by their shing
eets. Although, for a given quota, it is possible for national enforcement levels to be
e¢ cient, this does not hold when we are trying to achieve optimal management of the
shery using the TAC. Because enforcement is costly, a fully e¢ cient (rst-best) solu-
tion to management by TAC would be to set a TAC at a very low level and then to relax
enforcement to allow a relatively large margin of non-compliance (and hence an e¢ cient
level of harvest). This is not possible, however, if countries want to limit non-compliance.
We illustrate this problem within a set of simple numerical simulations for the (most
tractable) case of symmetrical countries and equal TAC shares. We compare the e¢ cient
levels of harvest, enforcement (given a TAC) and TAC itself (given a range of countries
implicit preferences for compliance).
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Lastly, we consider the incentives for countries to seek increases in the TAC during the
annual decision-making process in which a recommended TAC must be agreed upon by
participant countries. Interestingly, we nd that countries which care more about quota
compliance have a greater incentive to seek a higher TAC, since they gain more from
reduced enforcement costs as the TAC is increased.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by developing the non-compliant industry
harvest model and then examine the e¢ cient enforcement choices for individual countries,
given their national quotas (TAC shares). The countriesmyopic enforcement choices are
compared in the following section. In Section 4 we turn to the problem of setting an
e¢ cient TAC for an international shery with imperfect national enforcement and then
consider the incentives for participating countries to bid up an arbitrary TAC during
annual negotiations. Section 5 presents the results of a numerical simulation, while a nal
section concludes.
2. Model and preliminaries
We model a single species shery exploited by shing vessels from N countries which are
party to an international agreement on percentage shares of an annual TAC. Without loss
of generality, in what follows we consider the situation where N = 2.
2.1 The industrys harvest response function
We begin by modelling the harvest response (reaction function) of the industry in Country
5
i to the agreed national quota (TAC share) and the national level of enforcement e¤ort.
Here, following Beard and Nøstbakken (2010), enforcement e¤ort is normalised to the
probability that a particular rm is inspected and ned for landing over-quota sh (which
implies an underlying linear relationship between enforcement e¤ort and the probability
of inspection and sanction). For further simplicity, and to abstract from the problem of
allocative e¢ ciency at the national level, we represent the industry in each country by a
single (price-taking) rm. The rm chooses a level of harvest to maximise (expected) per
period prots, net of nes for non-compliance, as
max
h
E (i (hi;x)  ifi (hi; qi))  phi   ci (hi;x)  ifi (hi; qi) ; (1)
where hi is the harvest, p is the (exogenous) market price, ci () are harvesting costs, x is
the stock size (which the rm takes as given in the short run), i 2 [0; 1] is the countrys
chosen level of enforcement e¤ort (probability of detection), fi is a monetary ne and qi
is the national quota. To give a specic form to the rms objective function, let
E (i ()  ifi ())  phi  
ci
2x
h2i   ifi

hi   qi
qi

; hi  qi; (2)
where ci is a harvesting cost parameter4 and fi is a ne rate. Note that here the expected
penalty for landing over-quota sh is a linear function of the relative quota violation,
which ensures that the rms optimal per period harvest is dependent upon the size of the
quota qi.5 The necessary rst order condition for an (expected) prot-maximising level
4 Without loss of generality, we choose the simplest concave in harvest prot function, which assumes quadratic
costs.
5 Otherwise, the model could equally well represent a vessel operating under a management system based upon
taxes, rather than quotas. Note that we could, alternatively, have an expected penalty which is a non-linear
function of the level violation [h  q], but the functional form used here is less cumbersome. Hatcher (2005,
2012) considers the intuition for relative violation arguments in expected penalty functions and examines the
implications for modelling quota compliance in natural resource industries.
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of harvest is
p  ci
x
hi   i
fi
qi
= 0; (3)
where we assume that hi > qi and hence ifi=qi > 0, that is, the quota is less than the
industrys capacity output and there is non-compliance as a result. Capacity output hi
is therefore dened as the output the industry would choose in the absence of regulation,
where ifi=qi = 0 and hence
p  ci
x
hi = 0: (4)
Given a quota qi, however, from (3) we can nd the industrys optimal harvest response
to the countrys choice of enforcement e¤ort i as
hi (i; qi; x) =
x
ci

p  i
fi
qi

: (5)
From (5) we can see that, as would be expected, the industrys optimal harvest response
hi () is increasing in the stock size, the market price and the size of the quota and
decreasing in harvest costs, enforcement e¤ort and the ne rate. Note, in particular,
that
hi 
@hi ()
@i
=  xfi
ciqi
< 0: (6)
2.2 E¢ cient enforcement choice
Before proceeding to examine the individual countriesmyopic enforcement choices, we
consider, as a benchmark, the optimal level of enforcement for each country if a social
planner were responsible for the decision, given an agreed annual quota pair qi; i = 1; 2.
This is equivalent to the cooperative outcome for two countries interested in maximis-
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ing their joint social surplus under the same quota constraints. The specic objective
in this case is to employ enforcement e¤ort in both countries so as to maximise the to-
tal discounted ow of industry harvesting prots (including any nes, since these are
simply transfers) less the costs of enforcement, subject to the (known) industry harvest
responses and the dynamics of the stock, given the national quotas in force.6 Omitting
time arguments for clarity, the objective functional is
max
1;2
Z 1
0
e rt
(
2X
i=1
[i (h

i ())  !i (i)]
)
dt
s:t: _x = g (x) 
2X
i=1
hi () ; (7)
where !i (i) is the cost of enforcement in Country i, g (x) is the natural growth function
for the stock and r is an appropriate discount rate. Letting !0i (i)  !i, a constant
marginal cost of enforcement, the corresponding (current value) Hamiltonian is
Hc () 
2X
i=1
[i ()  !ii] + 
"
g (x) 
2X
i=1
hi
#
; (8)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier on the stock constraint.7 The necessary conditions for
maximising the Hamiltonian with respect to i > 0 are
Hc  [ih   ]hi   !i = 0; i = 1; 2; (9)
where
ih  @i ()
@hi
= p  ci
x
hi ; i = 1; 2: (10)
Substituting for hi and h

i using (5) and (6), we can see that the e¢ cient level of enforce-
6 We assume an appropriately long period of time: for the sake of argument we take an innite time horizon.
7 By specifying constant harvesting cost parameters ci, we make the implicit assumption that industry capacity
in each country remains xed. Arguably, a social planner aiming to maximise the economic value of the shery
would choose a combined level of capacity (capital) that is optimal for the TAC, but we ignore this possibility
here.
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ment e¤ort for Country i is where
i =
qi
fi

   !i ciqi
xfi

> 0: (11)
Note that i > 0 assumes that quotas are set at levels at which a positive level of costly
enforcement is optimal, which implies that the (second-best) harvest is greater than the
quota for each country, though less than industry capacity.
Rearranging (9), the rst order condition for i implies
 = ih   !i
hi
> 0; i = 1; 2; (12)
where, recall, hi < 0. Thus, the shadow price for the stock is greater than the marginal
prot from harvesting in Country i. The di¤erence is due to the (marginal) cost of
enforcement, or, more accurately here (since the control variables reduce harvest), the
marginal reduction in the cost of controlling the harvest through enforcement. Notice
from (6) that this is increasing in the size of the quota qi. This is because, all else equal,
in order to achieve any given harvest level, a larger quota implies a smaller violation which
is more costly to attain in terms of enforcement e¤ort. We can also see from (12) that if
the marginal cost of enforcement e¤ort !i is higher in one country than in the other, then,
all else equal, marginal prot (in harvest) must be smaller in that country and hence the
level of harvest greater. Thus, for a given quota pair, enforcement e¤ort, when allocated
optimally, is concentrated in the country where it is least costly to deploy.
The corresponding stock condition is
_  r =  Hcx   
2X
i=1
ix   
"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
; (13)
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where
ix  @i ()
@x
=
h
p  ci
x
hi
i
hix +
ci
2x2
h2i > 0 (14)
and
hix 
@hi ()
@x
=
1
ci

p  i
fi
qi

> 0: (15)
If we assume that a steady state is attained ( _x = _ = 0), then we can nd
 =
P2
i=1 ix
r   gx  P2i=1 hix : (16)
Substituting for  using (12) and rearranging terms, we obtain
r =
"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
+
P2
i=1 ix
ih   !i=hi
; i = 1; 2: (17)
Given the TAC and hence the national quotas qi, each countrys steady state harvest under
optimal enforcement satises the golden ruleshown in (17). The rst (bracketed) term
on the RHS of the equation is the (adjusted) marginal growth rate of the stock while the
second term on the RHS is the marginal stock e¤ect, i.e., the marginal value of the
stock in situ (which would be zero if harvesting costs were independent of stock size).
Equation (17) di¤ers from more familiar versions of the golden rule8 in the inclusion of
the hix and !i=h

i terms, which appear because the control variables are the quantities
of enforcement e¤ort, rather than harvest levels directly.
2.3 Noncooperative outcome
The noncooperative dynamic outcome for Country i as an open-loop Nash equilibrium
(OLNE) can be found fairly straightforwardly.9 In this case, we have the rst order
8 See Clark and Munro (1975): sometimes referred to as the fundamental equation of renewable resources (e.g.,
Conrad 1999).
9 The alternative feedback(closed-loop) Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE), in which enforcement choices
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condition for enforcement e¤ort i > 0 as
[ih   i ]hi   !i = 0 ) i = ih  
!i
hi
> 0; (18)
while the stock condition (taking the harvest by Country j as exogenous) is simply
_i   rii =  ix   i [gx   hix] : (19)
Solving for i , we obtain the steady state solution (assuming there is one) as 

i satisfying
ri = [gx   hix] +
ix
ih   !i=hi
; (20)
similarly for Country j.
Equation (20) is formally identical to (17), except that in the noncooperative case each
country does not take into account the stock e¤ect of its own harvest on the harvesting
costs of the other country.
3. Country-specic (myopic) enforcement
In practice, we assume, when each country is unilaterally deciding upon a level of enforce-
ment e¤ort, concern about the long term value of the stock is e¤ectively relegated to the
international TAC setting process (see Section 4): once an annual quota pair qi; i = 1; 2,
has been agreed, countries behave myopically and maximise only current period social
benets. Nevertheless, we assume that each country has some concern for adhering to
its agreed quota, which we represent by a perceived social cost attached to over-quota
harvesting by the countrys eet.10
depend upon the stock variable x, cannot be found analytically for our model. In general feedback solutions are
very di¢ cult to nd for dynamic shery games, except under rather special restrictions (see Long 2011).
10 This characterisation of national perceptions and priorities is not unrealistic within the EU, for example, where the
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Given this, Country is objective function is
max

i (h

i ())  !i (i)  i (hi () ; qi) ; (21)
where i () is a social damage(or disutility) function for exceeding the quota (measured
in monetary units for convenience). In specic form, we can write the countrys problem
as
max

h
phi () 
ci
2x
hi ()2
i
  !ii   i

hi ()  qi
qi

; (22)
where the last term, notice, implies that the country cares about the degree to which the
quota is exceeded, rather than the nominal violation. The rst order condition for the
optimal level of enforcement e¤ort i is then
p  ci
x
hi  
i
qi

hi   !i = 0: (23)
Substituting for hi and h

i using (5) and (6) and rearranging, we obtain
i =
qi
fi

i
qi
  !i ciqi
xfi

; (24)
which we can see is exactly analogous to (11). Here, though, since i is a parameter
describing the strength of the countrys desire to comply with its quota, the interpreta-
tion is that a positive level of enforcement e¤ort requires that i=qi > !iciqi=xfi. Since
!iciqi=xfi =  !i=hi, the marginal social cost to the country of over-quota landings must
exceed the (saving in) enforcement costs of a marginal increase in the over-quota catch:
otherwise, the country will not undertake any costly enforcement.
For a given pair of quotas qi, an e¢ cient level of enforcement would, as we might expect,
result from i=qi = 
 in each country. In e¤ect, for a given quota the parameter i
issues of sustainabilityand resource conservation are commonly regarded as problems to be tackled primarily
at Community, rather than Member State, level.
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represents the countrys own shadow pricing of the stock. If a country cares too little
about over-quota catches, the total level of enforcement will be sub-optimal and the total
level of harvest will be excessive. On the other hand, we also have the perverse possibility
that, if a country cares too much about over-quota landings, it will employ too much
costly enforcement e¤ort compared to the e¢ cient level. It should be apparent, however,
that what constitutes too much or too little enforcement, relative to the social optimum,
depends upon the magnitude of the quotas set. If, for example, the quotas are relatively
low, then the optimal amount of enforcement will be less than if the quotas were set at a
higher level (see Section 4). Under optimal enforcement, of course, the values of i and
 are jointly determined.
We can see from (24) that, all else equal, Country is choice of enforcement e¤ort i is
increasing in its disutility rate for over-quota catches i and decreasing in the size of
the quota qi and the cost of enforcement !i. We may recall that a standard result from
environmental enforcement models is that less enforcement e¤ort is required in order to
achieve a given target (e.g., level of harvest) if the ne is increased, since expected penalties
are a product of the ne and the subjective probability of detection and sanction (see, for
example, Sutinen and Andersen, 1985). Here, though, because there are social benets
as well as costs to violation (through increased industry prots and reduced enforcement
costs), the net impact of altering the ne rate fi on the optimal level of enforcement is
ambiguous. Increasing the ne, all else equal, increases the e¤ectiveness of enforcement
in reducing (over-quota) harvest, but while this reduces the disutility from over-quota
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catches, it also reduces industry prots. From
@i
@fi
=
qi
f 2i

2!i
ciqi
xfi
  i
qi

R 0; (25)
we can see that if i=qi > 2!iciqi=fix then increasing the ne reduces the optimal level of
enforcement e¤ort. If increasing the ne (which e¤ectively reduces the cost of controlling
harvest) reduces the social costs of (over-quota) harvesting more than the benets, we
would expect enforcement e¤ort to be relaxed. Conversely, if increasing the ne reduces
the benets of harvesting more than the social costs, we would expect enforcement to be
increased.
4. Setting the total allowable catch (TAC)
Having established the (myopic) enforcement e¤ort response of each country to a national
quota, given the harvest response of its shing industry, we now turn to the problem of
setting a TAC when the shares of the TAC used in calculating the national quotas are xed
and individual countries are responsible for enforcing quotas upon their shing industries.
We begin by examining the optimal TAC in a dynamic setting and then consider the
incentives for countries to bid upan arbitrary TAC during a political process.
4.1 Optimal TAC setting with xed quota shares
We let an omniscient central planner set an annual TAC (Q ) for the shery which
translates into national quotas qi  iQ for the two countries, where 1 + 2 = 1 are the
TAC shares that have previously been agreed. Using (24) and (5), we can rewrite the
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individual countriesenforcement choices in terms of Q as
i (Q;x) =
iQ
fi

i
iQ
  iQ
!ici
xfi

> 0; i = 1; 2; (26)
given their industriesharvest response functions
hi (

i ;x) =
x
ci

p  i (Q)
fi
iQ

> 0; i = 1; 2: (27)
Substituting (26) into (27) and rearranging, we obtain an expression for industry harvest
as a function of Q (given a stock size x) as
hi (

i (Q) ;x) =
x
ci

p  i
iQ

+ iQ
!i
fi
; i = 1; 2; (28)
where, recall, we assume that i () > 0 and hence hi > hi () > iQ, i.e., the industry in
each country is non-compliant but harvests at less than capacity due to the enforcement
e¤orts of a national regulator. Note that here
hi 
@hi
@i
=   x
ciiQ
< 0; (29)
while
hiQ 
@hi
@Q
=
xi
ciiQ
2
+ i
!i
fi
> 0; (30)
so that industry harvest is a concave function of the TAC as we approach capacity output
hi.
Omitting time arguments as before, the planners objective functional is now
max
Q
Z 1
0
e rt
(
2X
i=1
[i (h

i ())  !ii ()]
)
dt
s:t: _x = g (x) 
2X
i=1
hi () (31)
and the corresponding (current value) Hamiltonian is
Hc () 
2X
i=1
[i (h

i ())  !ii ()] + 
"
g (x) 
2X
i=1
hi ()
#
: (32)
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The rst order condition for a maximising choice of Q > 0 is
HcQ 
2X
i=1

[ih   ]hiQ   !iiQ

= 0; (33)
where, as before,
ih  @i ()
@h
= p  ci
x
hi () ; i = 1; 2: (34)
Substituting in (33) for hi () and hiQ using (28) and (30), together with
iQ 
@i ()
@Q
=  22iQ
!ici
xf 2i
< 0; (35)
after some rearrangement we obtain the optimality condition in the form
2X
i=1

xi
ciiQ
2

i
iQ
   

+ i
!i
fi

iQ
!ici
xfi
  

= 0: (36)
In order to interpret equation (36), consider the case where the two countries are identical
in every respect, including in their quota shares i: this ensures that the TAC is e¢ ciently
allocated. If we have positive levels of national enforcement e¤ort i (as we assume), we
can see from (26) that we must have
i
iQ
 > 
 > iQ
!ici
xfi
: (37)
Recall that, for any given quota qi, an e¢ cient level of myopic national enforcement would
require that i=qi = 
. Here though, because the non-compliance disutilityparameter
i does not represent a real resource cost, enforcement e¤ort is always oversupplied. Since
enforcement is costly, the (rst-best) e¢ cient approach to management by TAC would
be to set a very small TAC and then to relax enforcement in order to allow a relatively
large margin of non-compliance in order to achieve an e¢ cient level of harvest. Because,
as we have assumed, countries want to limit the extent of non-compliance, fully e¢ cient
TAC setting in this sense is not possible.
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We can see from (33) that if the two countries are identical (so that the TAC is e¢ ciently
allocated), we will have
 = ih   !i
iQ
hiQ
; i = 1; 2; (38)
i.e., in each country the shadow price of the stock is equated with the marginal prot of
harvest less the marginal cost of controlling harvest indirectly by means of adjustments
in the TAC.11 If the quota shares i are such that the TAC is not e¢ ciently allocated
(which, in practice, is very likely to be the case), we will have
 =
P2
i=1

ihh

iQ   !iiQ
P2
i=1 h

iQ
: (39)
Here, condition (33) will hold with
ih   !i
iQ
hiQ
>  > jh   !j
jQ
hjQ
; i 6= j: (40)
In this case, we can see that marginal social benets are too large in Country i and too
small in Country j, given the various national parameters. All else equal, greater marginal
social benets are here implied, for example, by larger values of !i (which increases savings
in enforcement costs) and smaller values of ci (which increases the marginal value of
harvests). If it were politically feasible, of course, we could simply adjust the shares i and
j so that the inequalities disappear and the TAC is e¢ ciently allocated. Alternatively, we
could conclude that (all else equal) Country i cares too much about over-quota landings
(i too large) and Country j too little (i too small).
The corresponding stock condition is
_  r =  Hcx   
2X
i=1
[ix   !iix   hix]  gx; (41)
11 Note that this is negative, since iQ < 0.
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where
ix 
h
p  ci
x
hi
i
hix +
ci
2x2
h2i > 0; (42)
as before, and
ix 
@i ()
@x
= 2iQ
2 !ici
x2f 2i
> 0: (43)
Assuming a steady state, we can nd
 =
P2
i=1 [ix   !iix]P2
i=1 h

ix   gx + r
(44)
and hence, using (39),
r =
"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
+
P2
i=1 [ix   !iix]P2
i=1

ihhiQ   !iiQ

=
P2
i=1 h

iQ
: (45)
With e¢ cient quota allocation, we have
r =
"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
+
P2
i=1 [ix   !iix]
ih   !iiQ=hiQ
; i = 1; 2; (46)
which can be compared with equation (17). Equation (46) di¤ers from equation (17) in
the appearance of  !iix in the numerator, and the replacement of !i=hi by !iiQ=hiQ
in the denominator, of the marginal stock e¤ect, since now harvest is a function of
national enforcement e¤ort, which is a function of the TAC set by the central planner.
4.2 Incentives to bid up a proposed TAC
Consider an arbitrary TAC Q, proposed either as the result of a stock assessment and
scientic advice or based upon historical levels of exploitation.12 For the purposes of our
discussion, let i Q < hi; i = 1; 2. We assume that the incentive for each country to try
12 In the Northeast Atlantic, scientic advice on sheries is provided by ICES (the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea). In the case of EU sheries, ICES advice is used by the European Commission to propose
TACs, which must then be agreed by the Fisheries Council, comprising the sheries ministers of all EU member
states. Proposed TACs are either advisory- based on stock assessments - or precautionary- based only upon
historic landings.
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to negotiate a higher TAC depends upon the (expected) increase in industry prots (net
of any ne payments), less the associated enforcement costs, together with a subjective
political cost incurred for increasing the TAC by appearing to be anti-conservationist.
Like i (), the subjective cost of exceeding the quota, this could include damage to in-
ternational reputation, as well as an internal (domestic) political cost. For simplicity, we
again assume that this can be represented by a monetary cost, which we will in this case
denote i
 
Q; Q

.13
To be specic, let i () be a non-linearly increasing function of

Q  Q, with
i () 
1
2
i

Q2   Q
Q

) @i ()
@Q
= i
Q
Q
: (47)
Given (33), we can nd the marginal social benet to Country i as a function of the TAC
Q (for a given stock size x) as
@SBi
@Q

h
p  ci
x
hi
i
hiQ   !iiQ: (48)
Note that, while the disutility for over-quota harvest is implicit in the determination
of i (Q) and hence h

i (

i (Q)), it does not appear explicitly in the countrys marginal
benet function since it does not represent a real resource cost. After substituting with
(28), (30) and (35), this expression can be rearranged to yield
@SBi
@Q
=
x2i
ci2iQ
3
+ 2iQ
!2i ci
xf 2i
> 0; (49)
which is decreasing in Q as we approach industry capacity harvest hi.
Straightforwardly, the incentive for Country i to press for an increase in the TAC is
13 The alternative, but inevitably more complex, approach would be to specify a utility function containing arguments
for both prots and political cost.
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exhausted where
x2i
ci2iQ
3
+ 2iQ
!2i ci
xf 2i
= i
Q
Q
: (50)
Solving (50) for Q, we can nd the (myopically) optimal negotiated TAC Q^i > Q for
Country i as
Q^i =
4
s
x2i =ci
2
i
i= Q  2i!2i ci=xf 2i
: (51)
The desired TAC Q^i can be seen to be decreasing in the political costparameter i, as
we would expect, but increasing in the complianceparameter i: all else equal, countries
which care more about quota compliance have a greater incentive to seek a higher TAC,
since their marginal gains reect greater reductions in enforcement costs. It is also possible
to show that Q^i is increasing in the TAC share i. The nding that countries with larger
TAC shares will seek a higher TAC may seem counter-intuitive. This is due, however, to
the greater nominal gains for such countries together with the implicit assumption that
the political cost (at least internationally) of seeking a higher TAC does not depend upon
whether or not the country has a high or low TAC share.14
Voluntary agreement on the TAC would, we presume, be obtained if Q^i = Q^j for Countries
i and j. Otherwise, either there must be an external arbiter to impose a decision, or, given
that the i are assumed xed, agreement requires countries to change their preferences
for sustainability, which implies changing their values of i (!). Alternatively, there could
be side payments, or de facto marginal adjustments of TAC shares by means of quota
exchanges.15
14 We could, alternatively, suppose that those countries with higher TAC shares would have a greater political stake
in the sustainability of the resource and hence a larger value of i.
15 Such ad hoc exchanges of quota are increasingly conducted between EU Member States, for example, following
20
5. Numerical simulation
Here we present some results from a set of numerical simulations. In order to keep things
relatively simple and tractable, we assume symmetrical countries and equal quota shares.
Our principle focus here is on the implications for e¢ cient harvesting of indirect control
of harvest through quota regulation.
5.1 Stock growth function and economic model parameters
We specify the stock growth function as
g (x)  x ln k
x
; (52)
where  and k are parameters. The marginal growth rate is then
gx = 

ln
k
x
  1

: (53)
With  = 0:30 and k = 100; 000 tonnes, the annual maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
is given by k=e = 11,040 tonnes, where the stock size x is equal to k=e = 36,790
tonnes.16
The parameter values for the economic models are as follows.
the December Fisheries Council meeting at which the TACs for the following year are decided.
16 All results are rounded to the nearest 10 tonnes or 100,000 euros.
21
Market price (e000) pi 2.0
Harvest cost parameter (e000) ci 5.0
Fine rate (e000) fi 7.5
Enforcement cost parameter (e000) !i 5.0
TAC shares i 0.5
Interest rate r 5%
If harvest is unregulated, there is no steady state solution. At a stock size of 30,000 tonnes,
for example, capacity harvest by both countries totals 24,000 tonnes, more than double
the sustainable yield of 10,840 tonnes. Without regulation, the shery would collapse.
5.2 E¢ cient harvest
We can nd the e¢ cient harvest (i.e., the level of harvest a social planner would choose
if she could mandate harvest without the need for enforcement) as the solution to the
steady state equations
gx +
P2
i=1 ix
ih
  r = 0; i = 1; 2; (54)
and
2X
i=1
hi = g (x) ; (55)
where
ix =
@i
@x
=
ci
2x2
h2i ; ih =
@i
@hi
= p  ci
x
hi : (56)
Given the parameters of our simulation model, we obtain the e¢ cient (steady-state) total
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annual harvest as 11,000 tonnes, shared equally between the two countries. The cor-
responding stock size is 39,750 tonnes. The total annual rents generated in the shery
are given by
2X
i=1
i (hi; x) =
2X
i=1
hi
h
p  ci
2x
hi
i
; (57)
which in this case amount to e18.2m.
5.3 E¢ cient enforcement
The e¢ cient levels of enforcement i in each country satisfy the steady state equations"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
+
P2
i=1 ix
ih   !i=hi
  r = 0; i = 1; 2; (58)
(which are implicit functions of i and x) together with the stock constraint. Here,
hix =
@hi
@x
=
1
ci

p  i
fi
qi

; hi =
@hi
@i
=  xfi
ciqi
; (59)
with
ix =
@i
@x
=
h
p  ci
x
hi
i
hix +
ci
2x2
h2i ; ih =
@i
@hi
= p  ci
x
hi : (60)
Suppose regulators set a (conservative) TAC of 9,000 tonnes, which translates into two
national quotas qi of 4,500 tonnes each. Then the e¢ cient levels of enforcement are found
to be equivalent to 0.066 or a 6.6% risk of detection in each country. The total annual
harvest is 10,840 tonnes (around 20% over quota) with the stock size at 30,030 tonnes.
Given the TAC, with e¢ cient enforcement annual total rents are e16.8m, but the total
cost of enforcement is e6.6m, reducing the total net economic value of the shery to
e10.2m.
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We can do better than this, however, by setting a lower TAC. With a TAC of 7,000
tonnes, for example, the total harvest is 10,960 tonnes from a stock of 32,610 tonnes.
Total rents are now e17.3m and enforcement costs are reduced to e5.4m, giving a net
value of e11.9m. A lower TAC results in a lower level of enforcement (now just 5.4%)
which allows eets to increase their quota non-compliance margin to 57%.
5.4 Myopic enforcement
Under myopic enforcement, as we have seen, only the assumption of a positive disutility
for over-quota harvest parameter i ensures that a country expends any enforcement
e¤ort. Given national quotas of 4,500 tonnes, a value for i of 7.19 in each country will,
in our model, achieve an e¢ cient level of enforcement e¤ort.
5.5 An e¢ cient TAC
The e¢ cient TAC Q is found by solving the implicit equations"
gx  
2X
i=1
hix
#
+
P2
i=1 [ix   !iix]
ih   !iiQ=hiQ
  r = 0; i = 1; 2; (61)
together with the stock constraint. In this case, we have
hi =
x
ci

p  i
iQ

+ iQ
!i
fi
; (62)
while
hix =
@hi
@x
=
1
ci

p  i
iQ

; hiQ =
@hi
@Q
=
ix
iQ
2ci
+ i
!i
fi
; (63)
with
ix =
@
@x
= 2iQ
2 !ici
x2f 2i
; iQ =
@
@Q
=  22iQ
!ici
xf 2i
: (64)
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To begin with, let us assume that each country has a i value equal to that which produced
an e¢ cient level of enforcement given a TAC of 9,000 tonnes (i = 7:19). The optimal
TAC is then found to be 8,150 tonnes. With this TAC, each countrys eet harvests
5,140 tonnes, exceeding their quota by a 26% margin, in response to an enforcement e¤ort
(risk of detection) of 8.2%. The steady state harvest is then 10,270 tonnes and the stock
size is 51,300 tonnes. Now total rents are e18.0m, but enforcement costs are e8.1m,
giving a net shery value of e9.8m.
We could suppose, alternatively, that countries wanted more strictly to limit the extent
of over-quota harvest, say to a margin of 5%. In our model, this would require i = 8:95.
The optimal TAC is now 9,880 tonnes with a total harvest of 10,370 tonnes from
a steady state stock of 50,270 tonnes. This requires enforcement e¤ort equivalent to
9.8%, which costs e9.8m compared to industry rents of e18.1m, reducing the net value
of the shery to e8.3m.
What happens if we relax the countriesattitudes towards compliance? Suppose that the
value of i is reduced to i = 3:00 in each country. Now, we nd that the optimal TAC is
only 3,660 tonnes, although the total harvest is little changed at 10,080 tonnes (175%
over quota), given that enforcement is now just 3.7%. The stock size is 53,170 tonnes.
Total rents are e17.8m, but enforcement costs are only e3.7m, giving a total net value
of e14.0m.
Now suppose that countries care very little about their eetscompliance. Let i = 0:10.
In this case the optimal TAC is just 130 tonnes. The level of enforcement is around
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0.1% in each country, permitting a total harvest of 10,020 tonnes (a relative quota
violation of 7,600%!). The steady state stock size is 53,710 tonnes. Total industry rents
are e17.7m, but with enforcement costs of little over e0.1m the total net value of the
shery is e17.6m.
6. Conclusion
We have analysed the exploitation of a shared sh stock by two countries with xed shares
of a TAC and imperfect control over their shing eetsquota compliance. We have in
mind an international system of sheries governance such as is encountered, on a larger
scale, in the EU. Given the harvest response function of its shing industry, each country
is assumed to choose an amount of costly enforcement e¤ort in order to maximise current
period economic benets, subject to what it considers an acceptable degree of compliance
with the national quota. The resulting level of enforcement is only e¢ cient for the quotas
in force if each countrys relative disutility for over-quota landings equates with the
shadow price of the stock under optimal enforcement. Otherwise, we have the possibility
that a country will expend too much costly enforcement e¤ort, as well as the possibility of
too little. Excessive costly enforcement implies a harvest level that is too low, even though
it may be closer to the quota set for the country concerned. Similarly, rst-bestquotas
(determined, perhaps, under the assumption of perfect and costless compliance) will be
too high when we take into account both non-compliance and the costs of enforcement,
as the numerical results clearly demonstrate.
Solving simultaneously the best-response harvest and enforcement choices of the countries
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and their shing eets, we found harvest as a direct function of the TAC. We then consid-
ered optimal management of the shery using the TAC as the control variable. Because
enforcement is costly, the most e¢ cient solution would be to set the TAC at a very low
level and to then use a minimal amount of enforcement in order to reach an e¢ cient level
of harvest by permitting a relatively large degree of quota non-compliance. In our model,
this is limited by the countriesdisutility for over-quota harvests (which nevertheless en-
sures that there is some enforcement e¤ort). While setting a small TAC and relaxing
enforcement may be rational, as the numerical simulations show, it is not (to our knowl-
edge) an approach that is observed in practice. The reasons for this are almost certainly
political, but a possible economic justication is that there are signicant non-pecuniary
(normative and social) incentives for quota compliance and that reducing the quota and
enforcement to induce a greater margin of illegal landings may result in a serious loss of
legitimacy for quota regulations per se.17 This analysis of the TAC setting process is a
major contribution of the paper, as it clearly diverges from the usual modelling of the
TAC as optimal harvest, whether in economic or purely biological terms.18
Finally, we considered briey the incentives for countries to seek increases in the TAC
above the level recommended during the annual TAC negotiations. In our analysis, the
only brake on seeking a higher TAC is provided by an assumed political cost for appear-
ing anti-conservationist. We could also interpret this as a real concern for resource
conservation, but experience of TAC negotiations in Europe would suggest that our char-
17 See, for example, Hatcher and Gordon (2005) and Nøstbakken (2013).
18 This is not the same, of course, as TACs which are deliberately set at a lower level in order to allow for discards
or undeclared landings. In order to keep our model relatively simple we have ignored the distinction between
catches and landings.
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acterisation is not unrealistic. We nd, interestingly, that countries which care more
about quota compliance gain proportionately more from increases in their quotas, since
they benet from greater reductions in enforcement costs, and hence, all else equal, may
argue more strongly for increases in the TAC.
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